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THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE AND THE LAW OF
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
I. BACKGROUND
The term "presumption" has caused confusion in its application to
the law of evidence, yet authorities agree that the purpose of a presump-
tion is generally to allow a logical inference of one fact or set of facts
from the existence of another.' These inferences are usually created by
establishing a relationship between proven or admitted facts and a fact
or factual conclusion which is sought to be proven. 2 Thus, circum-
stances which are likely to yield a particular result are elevated to the
stature of "presumption," and are thereby attributed considerable im-
portance for reasons of convenience and fairness to the parties in a
case.
3
Once such a relationship is established, a presumption may then be
used to allocate the burdens of proof and production in a case.4 Put
differently, the ultimate effect of a presumption is to allocate the respec-
tive responsibilities and duties between parties in a lawsuit. Despite the
degree of reliance placed upon presumptive inferences, it is generally
agreed that presumptions may not attain the same level of importance as
ordinary evidence. 5 Significantly, however, because of its burden allo-
1. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 965 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); see alsoJ.
KAPLAN &J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 761 (6th ed. 1987).
2. J. KAPLAN &J. WALTZ, supra note 1, at 761.
3. See generallyJ. KAPLAN &J. WALTZ, supra note 1, at 761-63; MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 342, at 965 (some courts treat standardized infer-
ences as presumptions).
4. J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, supra note 1, at 762. Thus, "[i]f B is presumed
from A, then on a showing of A, B must be assumed by the trier in the absence of
evidence of non-B. To put it another way, if A is shown, then the party who
asserts non-B has the production burden on the issue of B vel non ...... Id.
According to some authorities, "a true presumption should not only shift the
burden of producing evidence, but also require that the party denying the exist-
ence of the presumed fact assume the burden of persuasion on the issue as
well." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 342, at 965.
5. See, e.g., Hodge v. Me-Bee Co., 429 Pa. 585, 590-91, 240 A.2d 818, 821
(1968) (presumptions are not evidence; presumption of interest was rebutted as
matter of law where uncontroverted testimony was introduced as evidence); Al-
lison v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., 425 Pa. 519, 525, 229 A.2d 861, 864 (1967)
(presumptions act at best as mere arguments); Richmond v. A.F. of L. Medical
Serv. Plan, 421 Pa. 269, 271, 218 A.2d 303, 304 (1966) (use of presumption
would create impermissible thought injury's mind that defendants were entitled
to benefit of probative force of presumption); Lescznski v. Pittsburgh Rys., 409
Pa. 102, 105-06, 185 A.2d 538, 539-40 (1962) (rebuttable presumption that de-
cedent was exercising due care did not constitute proof that defendant negli-
gently caused decedent's death); Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 173
n.8, 146 A.2d 297, 302 n.8 (1958) ("[a] presumption is neither evidence nor a
substitute for evidence"); MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa. 558, 566-67,
(697)
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cating function, a presumption's lack of evidenciary value does not di-
minish its weighty consequences for each of the parties to an action.
This article focuses upon the continued viability of the enigmatic
presumption of due care which has recently become the subject of ex-
tensive litigation in Pennsylvania. Generally, the presumption of due
care comes into play when a deceased or otherwise incapacitated party
becomes unable to testify as to the particular incidents which gave rise
to a liability producing occurrence.6 In a series of recent decisions in
this area the appellate courts of Pennsylvania examined the reasoning
behind the existence of the presumption of due care and attempted to
clarify its continued vitality in light of the commonwealth's recently
adopted comparative negligence statute. 7 The issuance of two supreme
court decisions, both decided in the same year and each reaching appar-
ently opposite conclusions, thrust the concept of presumption of due
care into an abyss of confusion.8 Until recently, these conflicting court
decisions remained unchallenged. However, in 1988, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania was handed the task of reconciling these deci-
sions in the case of Vihlidal v. Braun.9
The presumption of due care is premised upon man's natural in-
stinct for self-preservation, and is couched in the theory that an individ-
ual will not purposefully expose himself to the possibility of serious
bodily harm.10 Simply stated, the presumption of due care proposes
36 A.2d 492, 496 (1944) (presumption of common carrier's negligence in train
accident served only to shift burden of proof); Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 315 Pa. 497, 504-06, 173 A. 644, 648 (1934) ("Presumptions are not
fact suppliers; they are guide-posts indicating whence proof must come .... No
presumptions ever take the place of proof."). But see Waddle v. Nelkin, 511 Pa.
641, 650, 515 A.2d 909, 914 (1986) (Larsen, J., concurring)(agreed that new
trial should be granted due to trial judge's failure to instruct jury as to presump-
tion of due care, but urged that such presumption be given weight of evidence).
6. See generally L. PACKEL & A. POULIN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE § 306.3
(1987) (discussing history and policy behind presumption of due care, and ques-
tioning validity of presumption in light of recent case law addressing issue).
7. The three most important and most recent cases in this series, which will
be the focus of this article, are Waddle v. Nelkin, 511 Pa. 641, 515 A.2d 909
(1986), Rice v. Shuman, 513 Pa. 204, 519 A.2d 391 (1986) and Vihlidal v. Braun.
371 Pa. Super. 565, 538 A.2d 881 (1988). For the applicable provisions of Penn-
sylvania's comparative negligence statute, see infra note 21.
8. Waddle v. Nelkin was decided on October 8, 1986, while Rice 7'. Shuman
was decided on December 16 of the same year. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 648, 515 A.2d
at 913 (upholding vitality of presumption of due care within comparative negli-
gence system); Rice, 513 Pa. at 214, 519 A.2d at 396 (characterizing presumption
of due care in case of deceased or incapacitated defendant as "useless appen-
dage" in light of state's adoption of comparative negligence). For a complete
discussion of the holdings of each case and the apparent contradictions found
within the rulings, see infra notes 18-50 and accompanying text.
9. 371 Pa. Super. 565, 538 A.2d 881 (1988). For a complete discussion of
Vihlidal, see infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
10. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396; see also Keasey v. Pittsburgh &
Lake Erie R.R. Co., 404 Pa. 63, 69, 170 A.2d 328, 331 (1961) (commenting on
698 [Vol. 34: p. 697
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where a [party's] mind is a blank as to an accident and all its
incidents, the presumption is that he did all that the law re-
quired him to do and was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The presumption, however, is a rebuttable one and must give
way when the facts as established by [a party's] evidence shows
that he was guilty of contributory negligence.I
The presumption was originally formulated for the benefit of the
plaintiff and was designed to overcome the burdens of the former com-
mon-law rule in Pennsylvania which required the plaintiff to present a
case free from his own negligence as a precondition to having his case
reach the jury. 12 The presumption relieved an incapacitated plaintiff
who was unable to testify of the responsibility of presenting evidence of
his own due care. The effect of the presumption was to shift the produc-
tion and persuasion burdens to the defendant to prove a plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence.13 Significantly, the presumption alone could not
supply affirmative evidence of due care; it merely shifted the burdens in
a case, thus creating a question of fact and allowing the case to proceed
past summary judgment. 14 For reasons of fairness, the presumption was
later applied to defendants in an effort to prevent a surviving competent
plaintiff from taking advantage of the death or incapacitation of a
defendant. 15
self-preservation instincts, court stated that "although it is inevitable that every-
one must eventually turn in his bat and glove, no one actually wants to hasten
the end of the ball game"); Moore v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 364 Pa. 343, 345,
72 A.2d 117, 119 (1950) ("When a person is killed in an accident a presumption
arises that he exercised due care, based upon the assumption that there is, in
man, an instinct of self preservation and the natural desire to avoid pain and
injury to himself."); Morin v. Kreidt, 310 Pa. 90, 97-99, 164 A. 799, 801 (1933)
(due to general presumption of natural instinct for self-preservation, court re-
fused judgment n.o.v. on issue that deceased was contributorily negligent where
he stood directly in path of oncoming truck).
11. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 645, 515 A.2d at 911 (citing Auel v. White, 389 Pa.
208, 214, 132 A.2d 350, 353 (1957)).
12. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396; see also Good v. City of Pittsburgh,
382 Pa. 255, 260, 114 A.2d 101, 103 (1955) (plaintiff must set forth case free
from contributory negligence or recovery is barred).
13. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396; see also Susser v. Wiley, 350 Pa.
427, 39 A.2d 616 (1944); Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Div., 352 Pa.
Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298 (1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 617, 521 A.2d 932
(1987); Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 329 Pa. Super. 139, 478 A.2d 1 (1984);
Yandrich v. Radic, 291 Pa. Super. 75, 435 A.2d 226 (1981), appeal dismissed, 499
Pa. 271, 453 A.2d 304 (1982).
14. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396. Without such a shift in burden,
the cases often would be summarily dismissed since it would be nearly imipossi-
ble for a deceased plaintiff's estate to prove the complete absence of negligence
by the deceased on his behalf.
15. Id.; see also Hawthorne, 352 Pa. Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298; Waddle, 511 Pa.
641, 515 A.2d 909; Kmetz v. Lochiatto, 421 Pa. 363, 219 A.2d 588 (1966); Wil-
1989] 699
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Until quite recently, few courts questioned the use of the presump-
tion of due care, and no Pennsylvania court had ever analyzed the status
of the rule in light of the adoption of a comparative negligence system. 1"
In 1986, however, the state supreme court was confronted with two such
cases in a span of several months. 17 This paper will critically examine
those two cases, along with the recent superior court decision in Vihlidal,
in light of Pennsylvania's adoption of a comparative negligence statute.
This examination will disclose that the presumption of due care is
merely a vestigial remain of Pennsylvania's contributory negligence era.
II. THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESUMPTION OF DUE
CARE: THE EFFECT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
The first Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to address the presump-
tion of due care after the adoption of comparative negligence was Wad-
dle v. Nelkin.' 8 In Waddle, an action was brought by an individual who
had been struck and injured by a motor vehicle. 19 The plaintiff had no
iams v. Flemington Transp. Co., 417 Pa. 26, 207 A.2d 762 (1965); Lear v.
Shirk's Motor Express Corp., 397 Pa. 144, 152 A.2d 883 (1959); Scholl v. Phila-
delphia Suburban Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 217, 51 A.2d 732 (1947).
16. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1989). For
the relevant provisions of the comparative negligence statute, see infra note 21.
17. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 18-50 and the accompa-
nying text.
18. 511 Pa. 641, 515 A.2d 909 (1986). With the legislative enactment of a
statute in 1978, comparative negligence replaced the common law rule of con-
tributory negligence in Pennsylvania. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102 (Purdon
1982 & Supp. 1989). Prior to this enactment, the law of contributory negligence
provided that any negligence by a plaintiff, contributing to and proximately
causing injury, would defeat his cause of action. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa.
199, 202, 34 A.2d 523, 525 (1943) (doctrine of comparative negligence not rec-
ognized in Pennsylvania, but any negligence of plaintiff contributing to and
proximately causing injury, defeats his action).
19. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 643, 515 A.2d at 910. The facts of the incident indi-
cated that on June 8, 1979, the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle operated by the
defendant while in the course of the defendant's employment. Id. The plaintiff
testified that around noon on the day of the occurrence, he had made a service
repair call for one of his trucks. Id. However, as to the incident, plaintiff had no
recollection. Id.
Perhaps significant to the ultimate outcome of this case was the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court's finding that the defendant's testimony was "suspect at
best." Id. at 645, 515 A.2d at 912. The court stated:
The [defendant] testified that at the time she observed Waddle she was
traveling between 20 to 25 miles per hour, yet, she was unable to bring
her vehicle to a stop prior to striking Waddle when he was 20 feet in
front of her. She further testified that she did not blow her horn to
alert Waddle of her presence. Finally, she testified that she did not re-
member a dent in either her automobile or the pickup truck, even
though she was driving a rented automobile which is always subject to
inspection for damages. Thus, it is clear that under all the facts the trial
court could not determine as a matter of law that Waddle was contribu-
torily negligent.
Id. at 645-46, 515 A.2d at 912.
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recollection of the occurrence itself, although he was able to testify con-
cerning facts prior to and after the accident. 20 After presentation of the
evidence at trial, the jury determined that the plaintiff was sixty percent
at fault while the defendant was only forty percent negligent, thus re-
quiring that a judgment be entered in favor of defendant in accordance
with Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute. 2 ' On appeal the
superior court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, bas-
ing its reversal on the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury that the
plaintiff was entitled to a presumption of due care because he lacked
recollection of the accident. 22
The supreme court affirmed the superior court's decision, and upon
ascertaining that no evidence had been presented which would rebut the
presumption of due care, a sharply divided court ruled that the trial
20. Id. at 643, 515 A.2d at 910. The plaintiff remembered the fact that the
pickup truck he was driving before the accident had no dents, whereas after the
occurrence, two dents existed behind the driver's door. Id. The plaintiff also
offered the testimony of a bystander who did not actually observed the impact,
but did hear a thud and observe the plaintiff "flying through the air." Id. Testi-
mony showed that the plaintiff's pickup truck and his disabled vehicle were
parked "partially on the curb, one in front of the other, such that the rear of the
pickup truck was facing the front end of the disabled tractor trailer." Id. The
bystander also observed that after completing his repairs, the plaintiff walked
around to the front end of the pickup truck, closed the hood, and proceeded
toward the driver's side of the vehicle. Id.
21. Id. at 644, 515 A.2d at 911. The comparative negligence statute pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence re-
sulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plain-
tiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a
recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negli-
gence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or
defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount
of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982).
22. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 644-45, 515 A.2d at 911. The plaintiff argued that
the jury instruction should have stated that "[w]here a plaintiff's mind is blank
as to an accident and all its incidents the presumption is that he did all that the
law required him to do and was not guilty of negligence." Id. at 644, 515 A.2d at
911. At the trial level, however, the defendant successfully argued that the in-
struction of presumption of due care was unnecessary since there was testimony
regarding the circumstances immediately prior to the accident. Id.
The supreme court found on appeal that since it was uncontested that the
plaintiff was suffering from amnesia, the only issue presented was whether the
evidence offered by the plaintiff rebutted the presumption. Id. at 645, 515 A.2d
at 911. The court found that since the plaintiff did not call the defendant as a
witness to establish the facts of the occurrence, and since the testimony of the
one witness called by the plaintiff only established facts prior to and subsequent
to the actual occurrence, no evidence to rebut the presumption of due care was
present in the case. Id. at 645, 515 A.2d at 911-12. The court did not view the
question of whether an instruction on the presumption of due care should have
been given as a significant issue on appeal. Id. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913.
19891
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judge had erred in failing to give the requested jury instruction. 2  The
court also held that the trial court's error was not harmless, since the
error was not obviated by the trial court's jury instruction which placed
the burden of establishing the plaintiff's contributory negligence on the
defendant. -4 In accordance with this finding, the supreme court re-
jected the argument that the adoption of comparative negligence in
Pennsylvania negated the necessity for a presumption of due care
instruction.25
To support its holding that the presumption instruction was neces-
sary, the court maintained that the presumption of due care serves a
separate purpose from that of an instruction allocating the burden of
proof in a case.2 6 The court concluded that while the presumption of
due care acts to supply the jury with a needed legal basis upon which to
conclude a party acted reasonably, an instruction allocating the burden
of proof does not. 27 According to the court, an allocation of burdens
merely establishes the parties evidentiary duties without any legal find-
ing of reasonableness. 28 The court stated that "[t]he presumption of
due care was created to provide a legal conclusion that if a plaintiff could
23. Id. at 648-49, 515 A.2d at 913. Justice Zappala wrote the opinion of the
court;Justice Larsen filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Papadakos;Jus-
tice McDermott filed a concurring opinion; Chief Justice Nix filed a dissenting
opinion which was joined by Justices Flaherty and Hutchinson; and Justices Fla-
herty and Hutchinson filed separate dissenting opinions. Id.
24. Id. at 646-48, 515 A.2d at 912-13. Interestingly, both the trial court and
the defendant agreed that if any error occurred due to the judge's failure to
instruct the jury as to the presumption of due care, such error would be harm-
less since the court had properly instructed the jury that the burden of proving
contributory negligence was to fall upon the defendant. Id. at 644-45, 515 A.2d
at 911. The supreme court, however, did not agree. Id. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913.
25. Id. For a discussion of the reasoning behind the court's decision, see
i'fra notes 26-32 and accompanying text. For an argument that the court did
not persuasively address the issue of the effect of the comparative negligence
statute on the presumption of due care, see infra notes 63-67 and accompanying
text.
26. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 647, 515 A.2d at 912-13. Justice Maxey eloquently
set forth an explanation of presumptions in Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co.
of America, 315 Pa. 497, 173 A. 644 (1934). In his statement regarding the
applicability of a presumption to jury deliberations, Justice Maxey explained:
In the deliberations of the jury there are permissible inferences
(sometimes miscalled "presumptions") rooted in general human expe-
rience and which have weight when the evidence, respectively, for and
against a fact in issue leaves the jury in a "twilight zone" of doubt as to
that fact. Such "presumptions may be looked upon as legally recog-
nized phantoms of logic, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the
sunshine of actual facts."
Id. at 512, 173 A. at 651 ("Presumptions ... may be looked on as the bats of the
law, flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts.")
(quoting Mockowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R. Co., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94
S.W. 256, 262 (1906)).
27. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 647, 515 A.2d at 912.
28. Id.
[Vol. 34: p. 697
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testify as to the events in question he would have substantiated that a
defendant acted unreasonably in comparison to his own actions."2' As
a result of these different purposes, the court found that a change in the
law from barring recovery for a plaintiff who acts negligently to evaluat-
ing the extent of a plaintiff's own negligence, does not change the con-
cerns of an unavailable plaintiff, nor does it defeat the purpose of the
presumption. 30 The majority reasoned that the new comparative negli-
gence statute only alters the method for evaluating liability and not how
an injury is established.3 ' Thus, the court concluded that the presump-
tion of due care is still a necessary device for supplying the jury with a
basis for establishing a party's innocence.3 2
Less than three months later, in apparent contradiction to the hold-
ing in Waddle, the supreme court handed down the decision of Rice v.
Shuman.3 3 In this decision another sharply divided court3 4 held that an
incapacitated defendant was not entitled to a jury charge stating that he
should be presumed to have been using due care for his own safety.35
Of particular importance was the reasoning behind the court's holding.
The court noted that the limited benefit derived from the use of the
presumption of due care running in favor of a deceased or incapacitated
defendant was no longer present as a result of the adoption of a system
of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania. 36
Similar to Waddle, the Rice case also arose as the result of injuries
sustained by parties in an automobile accident. 3 7 At the conclusion of
29. Id. at 647, 515 A.2d at 912-13.
30. Id. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913. Compare Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199,
202, 34 A.2d 523, 528 (1943) (doctrine of comparative negligence not recog-
nized in Pennsylvania, but any negligence of plaintiff contributing to, and proxi-
mately causing injury, defeats his action) with 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a)
(Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1989); Vargus v. Pitman Mfg. Co., 510 F. Supp. 116, 119
(E.D. Pa.) (Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act subsumed doctrine of con-
tributory negligence within doctrine of comparative negligence), aff'd, 673 F.2d
1304 (3d Cir. 1981). For the applicable provisions of Pennsylvania's compara-
tive negligence statute, see supra note 21.
31. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913.
32. Id.
33. 513 Pa. 204, 519 A.2d 391 (1986).
34. The Rice majority opinion was written by ChiefJustice Nix and was de-
cided by a narrow four to three vote, with Justices Larsen, McDermott and Zap-
pala filing dissenting opinions. Id. at 204-05, 519 A.2d at 391-92.
35. Id. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395.
36. Id. at 210, 519 A.2d at 394. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see
infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
37. Rice, 513 Pa. at 207, 519 A.2d at 393. This suit resulted from a collision
which occurred on August 21, 1979 in Philadelphia. Id. Just prior to the acci-
dent the defendant and one passenger were in a vehicle traveling in a southerly
direction. Id. The other driver, the plaintiff, along with one passenger, had
been proceeding in a northerly direction on the same street and was making a
left-hand turn to proceed in a westerly direction. Id.
As a result of the accident, the defendant's passenger sustained multiple
injuries to her extremities and forehead, rendering her unable to work and sub-
7
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the presentation of evidence, the jury found that both the plaintiff and
the defendant were responsible in varying degrees for the accident. The
defendant was assigned seventy percent of the fault, while the plaintiff
was found to be only thirty percent negligent. 38 The trial court had in-
structed that the defendant's absence was due to incompetence resulting
from injuries sustained in the accident and that no adverse inference
should be drawn from his failure to testify. 39 On appeal, the defend-
ant's primary claim was that the trial court refused to give a requested
point of charge providing for a presumption of due care to run in his
favor.40
In deciding whether the presumption of due care was appropriate
stantially diminishing the quality of her life. Id. The passenger in the plaintiff's
vehicle suffered fractures which permanently rendered her right leg shorter than
her left. Id. The plaintiff himself incurred injuries to the right knee and left
hand resulting in permanent disability. Id. Most importantly for the issue facing
the court, the defendant sustained severe head injuries which rendered him in-
competent to testify at the time of the jury trial. Id.
38. Id. at 208, 519 A.2d at 393. The jury's damage award, after the trial
judge molded the verdict to reflect the apportionment of negligence and to re-
flect the settlement that had been reached by the plaintiff and the defendant
prior to trial, amounted to the following final judgments entered against the
defendant: 1) in favor of the defendant's passenger for $429,800; 2) in favor of
the defendant's passenger's spouse in the amount of $35,000; 3) in favor of the
plaintiff's passenger in the amount of $280,000; and 4) in favor of the plaintiff
for $175,000. Id.
39. Id. at 210-11, 519 A.2d at 394-95.
40. Id. at 208-09, 519 A.2d at 394. The requested point of charge asking
the judge to raise the presumption of due care on behalf of the defendant was
phrased as follows:
When a person injured in an accident is rendered incompetent by
his injuries or has lost his memory as a result of his injuries so that he is
unable to testify as to how the accident occurred, the law presumes that
at the time of the accident that person was using due care for his own
safety.
Id. at 209, 519 A.2d at 394.
After denial of the requested charge, the trial judge gave the followingjury
instructions applicable to the respective burden of proof and the effect of com-
parative negligence:
First off, Dr. David Shuman can't be here today and no inference
should be taken adversely to him because he can't be here today.
You've heard that he had been declared to be incompetent by the
Court of Common Pleas, of which this is a part, and therefore, his
[non]appearance is unavoidable .... Comparative Negligence is pri-
marily involving adjustment of the figures where two people are in-
volved in an accident and there's a different degree of negligence, a
different weight to be given to the negligence, both of them. Conse-
quently, the comparative negligence will apply to all the plaintiffs in this
case if you find that there was negligence on the part of Kurt Rice. But
again, that does not change and it does not affect your dollar figures.
All adjustments are made by the court once you put down what you
believe the verdict should be. If you find that there was some negli-
gence, then you determine whether or not the weight of that negligence
is to be defined percentagewise. You must do that, and when you do
that the Court will then adjust the verdict according to what you've
8
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under these facts, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was required to pass
upon the viability of the presumption in light of the adoption of compar-
ative negligence in Pennsylvania. 4 1 In undertaking this task, the court
first focussed upon the perceived role of the presumption under the
prior Pennsylvania law,4 2 and then examined its success in achieving this
role in light of the revised law which had been adopted.
43
In its analysis, the court stressed that presumptions are designed
merely to allocate the respective responsibilities of parties in a lawsuit by
directing parties to assume the burdens of persuasion and proof in a
case. 44 Presumptions are not, the court commented, intended to act as
evidence.4 5 In light of these conclusions, the court reasoned that the
presumption of due care serves no purpose when applied to a defend-
ant, since the presumption may not be used as evidence to offset negli-
gence introduced by the plaintiff against the defendant. 46 For the same
reason, the defendant also may not use a presumption to establish evi-
dence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. 47 Additionally, the
court stated that the presumption of due care does not serve to allocate
the burden of proof when applied to defendants, since the plaintiff al-
ways has this burden where the defendant's negligence is alleged, re-
gardless of the defendant's presence or absence in the proceeding. 48
done. You have to first find negligence and then apply the Doctrine of
Comparative Negligence.
Id. at 210-11, 519 A.2d at 394-95 (quoting Record at 713a-15a).
41. Id. at 207, 519 A.2d at 393. For a discussion of how the decision in Rice
was reconciled and contrasted with the conclusions forwarded by the court in
Waddle, see infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
42. Rice, 513 Pa. at 209, 519 A.2d at 394. For a discussion of the role that
the presumption of due care played under Pennsylvania's prior law, see supra
notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
43. Rice, 513 Pa. at 210-12, 519 A.2d at 394-95. For the relevant provisions
of Pennsylvania's adopted comparative negligence statute, see supra note 21.
44. Rice, 513 Pa. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395 (citing Waugh v. Commonwealth,
394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958); MacDonald v. Pennsylvania R.R., 348 Pa.
558, 36 A.2d 492 (1944); Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 315 Pa. 497, 173
A. 644 (1934)). For a discussion of the cited cases and the role that the pre-
sumption of due care and presumptions in general play in the introduction of
evidence, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
45. Rice, 513 Pa. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395. For a discussion of the proposi-
tion that presumptions do not function as evidence, see upra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
46. Rice, 513 Pa. at 212, 519 A.2d at 395.
47. Rice, 513 Pa. at 212, 519 A.2d at 395-96. In support of the proposition
that presumptions bear no evidentiary weight, see supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
48. Rice, 513 Pa. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395. In support of its position, the
court stated that "[tlhe plaintiff has the burden of proving the negligence of the
defendant as the legal cause of the accident. This therefore places upon the
plaintiff the obligation of both coming forward with the evidence of the defend-
ant's negligence and persuading the ftIctfinder on this issue." Id. (citing Mapp v.
Wombucker, 421 Pa. 383, 384-85, 219 A.2d 681, 682 (1966); Fegely v. Costello,
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Thus, according to the majority, the only remaining concern is that
a jury might improperly draw an adverse inference from a party's ab-
sence in a proceeding.4 9 The court quickly dismissed this issue, how-
ever, since the trial judge had already properly addressed these
concerns and since the use of a presumption in the case of a defendant
would act to obfuscate, rather than clarify, the issue for the jury.50
III. VIHLIDAL v. BRA UN
The apparent inconsistencies of Waddle and Rice remained unchal-
lenged for over a year until the Pennsylvania Superior Court was finally
called upon in Vihlidal v. Braun5 ' to interpret the prior supreme court
decisions. In Vihlidal, the plaintiff, in a wrongful death action resulting
from an automobile collision, appealed from a jury verdict for the de-
fendant. 52 Among the issues raised by the appeal was a claim that the
trial court erred in refusing a request for a jury instruction of presump-
tion of due care for the plaintiff's decedent. 5 3
Because there were no witnesses to the collision, both sides
presented expert witnesses who differed in opinion as to the point of
impact of the parties' automobiles. 5 4 To complicate matters, neither
party involved was capable of providing testimony as to the circum-
stances of the collision. 55 As a result, each side sought to have the jury
instructed that due care should be presumed to have been used at the
417 Pa. 448, 449, 208 A.2d 243, 244 (1965); Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116,
117-18, 196 A.2d 295, 296 (1964)).
49. Id. at 212-13, 519 A.2d at 396.
50. Id. at 212-14, 519 A.2d at 395-96. According to the supreme court, the
respective burdens as to production and persuasion are easily explained to a
jury, and thus, the imposition of the presumption of due care is a useless appen-
dage and may serve to confuse, rather than to clarify the issues for the jury. Id.
at 212, 519 A.2d at 395. The court noted that the present case represented an
excellent illustration of how a clear jury instruction, with respect to the burden
of each of the parties, was adequate under the law of comparative negligence
without resort to the presumption of due care. Id. at 210, 519 A.2d at 394.
Moreover, the court emphasized that the same objectives accomplished by pre-
sumption could be accomplished by an appropriate instruction without the in-
creased confusion which would accompany the use of a presumption. Id.
51. 371 Pa. Super. 565, 538 A.2d 881 (1988).
52. Id. at 566, 538 A.2d at 881. The record revealed that an automobile
accident occurred when the truck driven by the plaintiff's decedent collided with
the automobile driven by the defendant. Id. at 566-67, 538 A.2d at 881. Prior to
the accident, both drivers had been traveling in opposite directions along the
same road. Id.
53. Id. at 566, 538 A.2d at 881.
54. Id. at 567. 538 A.2d at 881. At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified that
the defendant's vehicle traveled across the center line and collided with the de-
ceased's truck. Id. The opposition's expert was of the opinion, however, that
the point of impact occurred in the northbound lane, indicating that it was the
other party which had crossed over the center line. Id.
55. hi. As a result of the accident the plaintiff' suffered injuries which
caused his death the next morning, and the defendant testified that he was un-
[Vol. 34: p. 697
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time of the accident. 5" The trial judge refused both requests, and his
ruling was appealed. 5 7 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
supreme court's holding in Rice should deprive the plaintiff of a pre-
sumption of due care charge. 58 According to the defendant, a proper
interpretation of the Rice decision would command that the due care
instruction be disallowed "for any deceased or incapacitated party."15"
Because of defendant's contentions, the superior court was finally faced
with the task of interpreting the prior conflicting supreme court rulings
in the area of presumption of due care.
Despite the potential importance of its decision, the Vihlidal court
resolved the apparent conflicts in the law without tackling many of the
toughest questions presented. Rather than choose between the conflict-
ing supreme court rulings and run the risk of being overturned, the su-
perior court took a safer approach, attempting to reconcile Rice and
Waddle by distinguishing them on their facts. Because the facts of Rice
involved a defendant rather than a plaintiff, as in Waddle, the superior
court opined that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court only intended its
prohibition against the presumption of due care to extend to defendants,
while leaving intact the presumption for plaintiffs.6 0 The ihlidal court
able to recall the events of the accident as a result of the injuries he sustained.
Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 567, 538 A.2d at 881-82.
58. Id. at 568, 538 A.2d at 882. The defendant's contention was in re-
sponse to the plaintiff's reliance on Waddle in support of his claim of presump-
tion. Id. at 568, 538 A.2d at 882. The ihlidal court found it significant that the
Waddle court: 1) found no evidence to rebut the presumption of due care and
ruled that the trial court erred in failing to give the requested jury instruction:
2) concluded that the error by the trial court was not harmless error; and 3) re-
jected the argument that the adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence
in Pennsylvania negated the necessity for the presumption of due care instruc-
tion. Id. at 568, 538 A.2d at 883.
59. Id. at 568, 538 A.2d at 882. The plaintiff in 'ihlidal argued that the
supreme court's decision in Waddle was tempered by its ruling one month later
in Rice. Id. According to the plaintiff's interpretation of the case, Rice found that
only incompetent defendants were not entitled to a charge on the presumption of'
due care. Id. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that a reading of Rice as
disallowing use of the presumption only to deceased or incapacitated dtfeindalns
was too narrow and that Rice abolished the presumption for all parties. Id.
60. Id. at 570, 538 A.2d at 883. As to the use of' the presumption of due
care, the Rice court had stated:
The obvious motive for the application of the presumtption Ito a defend-
ant was to prevent a surviving competent plaintiltt from taking advan-
tage of the death or incapacitation of the defendant. However, the
recognized effect of the ipresumption does no more than prevent a de-
fendant's absence from lessening the burden upon the plaintifl' of es-
tablishing the deftendant's negligence. Since the burden upon the
plaintiff has been established wihout regard to the availability of the
defendant to personally defend, it serves no purpose in this context.
Rice, 513 Pa. at 212. 519 A.2d at 396. In conclusion, the court remarked thai
"[iln any event, it is apparent under pIresent law that the presumption of' due
11
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held that Chief Justice Nix, although he began his opinion in Rice by
discussing the use of presumptions in litigation generally, intended to
specifically restrict his holding to cases where the presumption was
sought in favor of a deceased or incapacitated defendant.li' The court
also held that because the supreme court heard both cases in a span of
several months and failed to specifically overrule Waddle, the first of the
two cases to be decided, its intent must have been to keep the presump-
tion of due care viable for plaintiffs while denying its use to
defendants. 6 2
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
It is submitted that the language of the Rice decision indicates that
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court intended to preclude the use of the
presumption of due care for all parties, and not just where the incapaci-
tated litigant happens to be a defendant. In addition, it is submitted
that, regardless of whether the Rice court intended to preclude the pre-
sumption for all parties, the concept of a presumption of due care has
been rendered useless in light of the adoption of a comparative negli-
gence system in Pennsylvania. Thus, in light of each of these theories, it
is further contended that the Vihlidal case wrongly retains the presump-
tion of due care for plaintiffs. Finally, because Rice should be read to bar
the use of the presumption of due care for all parties, it is submitted that
until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has an opportunity to review Vih-
care running in favor of a deceased or incapacitated defendant is a useless appen-
dage which is likely to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues to be resolved in
the lawsuit." Id. at 213-14, 519 A.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
61. Vihlidal, 371 Pa. Super. at 570, 538 A.2d at 883.
62. Id. The ihlidal court rejected the defendant's interpretation of the
prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 569, 538 A.2d at 883. The
court ruled that Waddle entitles a deceased plaintiff to receive the presumption of
due care, while Rice declined to provide the presumption to a deceased or inca-
pacitated defendant. Id. at 570, 538 A.2d at 883. The I'illidal court concluded
that since the supreme court had both cases before it for simultaneous consider-
ation, yet did not specifically overrule Wl'addle by restricting its holding in Rice to
the use of presumptions by defendants, the court in the present case was re-
quired to do the same. Id. In support of its position, the court pointed out the
following facts regarding Waddle and Rice:
The Opinion announcing theJudgment of the [lI'addle] Court was writ-
ten by justice Zappala, Justice Larsen filed a Concurring Opinion in
which Justice Papadakosjoined and Justice McDermott filed a Concur-
ring Opinion, Chief Justice Nix filed a Dissenting Opinion in which Jus-
tices Flaherty and Hutchinson joined and each of them filed separate
Dissenting Opinions. The case was argued on March 5, 1986 and de-
cided on October 8, 1986.
In Rice v. Shuman, Chief'Justice Nix wrote the Opinion of the Court
in which he was joined by Justices Flaherty, Hutchinson and Papadakos.
Justices Larsen, McDermott and Zappala each wrote Dissenting Opin-
ions. That case was argued on April 15, 1986 and decided )ecemher
16, 1986.
hI. at 569-70, 538 A.2d at 883.
[Vol. 34: p. 697
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lidal, the holding of the superior court should be viewed cautiously and
its impact minimized.
The majority in Rice clearly indicated its belief that Waddle had not
finally decided the viability of presumptions of due care in light of the
adoption of comparative negligence in the state. The Rice court began
its opinion by stating that Waddle had not "definitive[ly] resol[ved] ...
the impact of comparative negligence upon the continuing viability of
the presumption of due care in [the] jurisdiction" and that the question
had "heretofore proven elusive" in any of the supreme court's prior de-
cisions. 6 3 Despite the Waddle court's further statement that "compara-
tive negligence has no effect on the use of the presumption of due
care," 64 the majority in Rice contended that this was not a definitive res-
olution of the matter because the prior court had failed to "focus upon
the role that the presumption was perceived to fulfill and ... to examine
its success in achieving the anticipated result."' 65 The Rice court appar-
ently viewed the Waddle court's discussion of comparative negligence as
merely dictum because it was not the deciding factor for the court in that
case. Presumably because the issue had received only passing attention,
the Rice court found that Waddle's effect as the definitive holding on the
question of presumption of due care after the adoption of comparative
negligence was minimal. 66
It is evident from the Rice opinion's language that the supreme
court believed the facts of Rice presented a unique question which had
never before received adequate attention from the judiciary. 6 7 By find-
ing that the decision presented a question of first impression, the court
relieved itself of the obligation of explicitly overruling Waddle, although
that case was decided only a few months earlier in a seemingly contra-
dictory manner. The Rice court reasoned that because no prior decision
63. Rice, 513 Pa. at 209, 519 A.2d at 394.
64. Waddle, 511 Pa. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913.
65. Rice, 513 Pa. at 209-10, 519 A.2d at 394.
66. Id. at 209, 519 A.2d at 394. For a discussion of the court's reasoning in
Rice which lead to its conclusion that the impact of comparative negligence had
not been definitively addressed by the prior decisions, see supra the text accom-
panying notes 63-65. In its decision, the Waddle court reserved only one para-
graph at the very end of its decision for the question of the viability of the
presumption of due care in light of the adoption of contributor%, negligence:
As previously stated a jury instruction on the presumption of due care
serves a different purpose from that of a comparative negligence in-
struction allocating the burden of proof. The change in our law from
barring recovery for a plaintiff who acts negligently to evaluating the
extent of a plaintiff's own negligence in determining the substantial
factor in causing the injuries does not obviate the concerns of a plaintiff
suffering from amnesia. Comparative negligence only altered how an
injury is evaluated not how it is established. Therefore, the adoption of
comparative negligence has no effect on the use of the presumption of
due care.
Waddle, 511 Pa. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913.
67. See Rice, 513 Pa. at 209-10, 519 A.2d at 394.
1989]
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had applied the presumption of due care in light of the effect of compar-
ative negligence, its decision was unique. 68 Thus, the court viewed its
opinion as promulgating new law, rather than reinterpreting or overrul-
ing a pre-existing rule of law.
Even assuming that the Waddle court did adequately address the is-
sue of comparative negligence, it remains evident that the conclusions of
the Rice court effectively overruled any such prior decision on the same
issue. Significantly, after analyzing the purpose of the presumption of
due care under Pennsylvania's prior law and examining the presump-
tion's utility under the new system of comparative negligence, the Rice
court concluded:
Utilizing such an analysis it becomes obvious that the limited
benefit derived from the use of the presumption [of due care]
under prior law is clearly no longer present as a result of the adoption
of a system of comparative negligence within this jurisdiction. The
instant appeal provides an illustration of a fair and clear instruction to
thejuy with respect to the burden of the respective parties with-
out resort to the presumption of due care.6"
Implicitly, such broad sweeping language leaves no doubt as to the
court's intention to have its holding conclusively decide the issue of the
presumption of due care under the system of comparative negligence.
Likewise, there can be no doubt that the court intended the scope of
its holding in Rice to include all parties who formerly had been entitled
to receive an instruction on the presumption of due care-both incapac-
itated plaintiffs and defendants. In stating that Rice provided an illustra-
tion of a fair and clear instruction to the jury without resort to the
presumption of due care, the court was clearly using the facts of the case
before it simply as one example (one which was presently available) of
the obsolescence of the presumption of due care, and not as an ultimate
limitation denying the presumption only to defendants.(l As the court's
specific language did not distinguish between plaintiffs and defendants,
the fact that the case involved a defendant rather than a plaintiff should
be viewed as irrelevant to the court's ultimate ruling.
Irrespective of the Rice court's holding, it is evident that the pre-
sumption of due care no longer performs an indispensable function
under a system of comparative negligence and thus, as intended by Rice,
should be abolished for all parties. It is also clear that instructing a jury
on presumption of due care is not vital to the jury's functioning and in
fact, may even hinder the decision-making process by creating
confusion.
Viewed in an historic context, the arguments for precluding a de-
68. See id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id.
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fendant from receiving the presumption of due care seem quite strong.
Although at first glance use of the presumption for defendants unable to
testify at trial may appear to provide a degree of protection, 7 1 such insu-
lation proves illusory under Pennsylavnia law since courts have unani-
mously held that presumptions may not function as evidence in cases. 72
As set forth previously, presumptions serve only to allocate the respec-
tive burdens in a case and may not be introduced as evidence to prove a
defendant's innocence or to establish a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence. 73 Thus, in the absence of its function to allocate the burdens of
persuasion and production, the presumption has little or no utility.
As to defendants, the presumption of due care has little utility in
allocating the burdens of a case since these burdens automatically fall
upon plaintiffs during the usual course of litigation.74 Even under the
old law of contributory negligence, the burdens of a case were upon the
plaintiff.75 Thus, aside from the illusory objective of "fairness," the util-
ity of the presumption as applied to defendants appears tenuous even
under the prior contributory negligence system. 76 To presume that a
defendant used due care in an accident would shift the burden of prov-
ing the legal cause of the accident away from the defendant who never
had this duty, to the plaintiff who always had the duty, thereby creating a
circuitous route to a preordained conclusion.
Denying the presumption of due care to a plaintiff is a more compli-
cated issue. As stated previously, the presumption of due care was origi-
71. See id. at 212, 519 A.2d at 396. As the Rice court stated, -[t]he obvious
motive for the application of the presumption to a defendant was to prevent a
surviving competent plaintiff from taking advantage of the death or incapacita-
tion of the defendant." Id.
72. See id. The Rice court readily discredited the value of the presumption
of due care to a defendant in preventing a competent plaintiff from taking ad-
vantage of the defendant's death or incapacitation:
[T]he recognized effect of the presumption does no more than prevent
a defendant's absence from lessening the burden upon the plaintiff of
establishing the defendant's negligence. Since the burden upon the
plaintiff has been established without regard to the availability of the
defendant to personally defend, it serves no purpose in this context.
Id.
73. For a discussion of the weight to be attributed presumptions generally.
see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
74. Rice, 513 Pa. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395.
75. See Mapp v. Wombucker, 421 Pa. 383, 384, 219 A.2d 681, 682 (1966)
(burden on plaintiff to prove detendant was negligent and that negligence proxi-
mately caused accident); Antonson v. Johnson, 420 Pa. 558. 561, 218 A.2d 123,
124 (1966) (same); Fegely v. Costello, 417 Pa. 448, 449, 208 A.2d 243, 244
(1965) (same); Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116, 118, 196 A.2d 295, 296 (1964)
(same).
76. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213-14, 519 A.2d at 396. "The purpose... [the pre-
sumption of due carel served for the defendant, even under prior law, is cIues-
tionable since it was recognized that the plaintiff ahvavs had the burden of
prov'ing defendant's negligence and it was accepted that the presumption did
not supply evidence." Id. at 213 n.6, 519 A.2d at 396 n.6.
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nally developed to overcome the former rule under contributory
negligence which required plaintiffs to present a case completely free
from their own negligence. 7 7 Obviously, a plaintiff who was unable to
testify would find it difficult to meet this burden. In order to avoid the
inequitable result of disqualifying a critically or fatally injured plaintiff
who may have been completely free from fault, the presumption of due
care acted to shift the burden to the defendant to come forward with
evidence of the plaintiff's negligence. 78
With the adoption of a comparative negligence system, the require-
ment that a plaintiff establish complete non-negligence in order to sus-
tain a cause of action disappeared, and along with it disappeared the
need for a presumption of due care. The court in Waddle was incorrect
in asserting that a comparative fault system does not obviate the con-
cerns of plaintiffs. 7 11 The adoption of comparative negligence changed
both the method for evaluating an injury and the method for establish-
ing that injury. In a system of comparative negligence, a plaintiff can be
negligent to varying degrees and still sustain a cause of action. 8 °1
Under comparative negligence, the burden of proving a plaintiff's
negligence falls upon a defendant from the very beginning of an action,
thereby negating the need to shift the burden to him. 8 1 Additionally,
even if a plaintiff were presumed to have exercised due care, such a pre-
sumption is of little utility under comparative negligence. The pre-
sumption cannot be used to absolve the plaintiff from a showing that he
was negligent due to the general restriction against using a presumption
as evidence.8 '2 Thus, this new method for evaluating negligence renders
the utility of a presumption of due care questionable in light of the auto-
matic shifting of burdens which occurs under comparative fault's system
of "give and take negligence." It is increasingly difficult under compara-
tive negligence to see a difference between the presumed care of a plain-
77. Id. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396. For a discussion of the origins of the pre-
sumption of due care, see supra notes 10-15 and accompany'ing text.
78. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213, 519 A.2d at 396.
79. See 11"addle, 511 Pa. at 648, 515 A.2d at 913 ("The change in our law
from barring recovery for a plaintiff who acts negligently to evaluating the extent
of a plaintiff's own negligence in determining the substantial factor in causing
the injuries does not obviate the concerns of a plaintiff suffering from aniesia.
Comparative negligence only altered how an Injury is evaluated not how it is
established.").
80. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1989). For
the applicable provisions of the comparative negligence statute which allows
fault in varying degrees, see supa note 21 and accompanying text.
81. Rice, 513 Pa. at 211, 519 A.2d at 395; see also Helernan v. Rosser. 4 19
Pa. 550, 555, 215 A.2d 655, 657 (1966) (defendant has burden of establishing
contributory negligence): Stegmuller v. )avis, 408 Pa. 267, 269, 182 A.2d 745,
747 (1962) (same); Brown -. ,Jones. 404 Pa. 513, 516, 172 A.2d 831. 833 (1961)
(same); McKnil'%v. Wilson, 404 Pa. 647, 652, 172 A.2d 801, 803 (1961) (same).
82. Fegely v. Costello, 417 Pa. 448, 449, 208 A.2d 243, 244 (1965). For a
discussion of, the weight to be aflOrded the presumption of due care, see s//n'a
note 5 and accompanying text.
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tiff and the rule that the burden of proving contributory negligence falls
upon the defendant. In sum, under the common law principle of con-
tributory negligence, the presumption of due care did not establish the
negligence of the defendant. Instead, it simply shifted the burden of
proving the plaintiff's lack of due care to the defendant.8 :3 Likewise,
under the present system of comparative negligence, a presumption of
due care would not establish the negligence of either party. Although
the newly adopted system of comparative negligence rquires a compar-
ison of the relative actions of both parties in determining fault, such
does not act to enhance the evidentiary powers attributed to presump-
tions in any way. Instead, negligence on the part of the defendant or the
plaintiff must still be established by some external evidence of the inci-
dent or by some other mechanism specifically designed to accomplish
this objective. 84
V. CONCLUSION
With the adoption of comparative negligence in Pennsylvania, the
death knell has been sounded for the continued application of the pre-
sumption of due care. In light of the above discussion, the presumption
should only be used to exculpate a plaintiff in the context of the prior
law of contributory negligence in which the presumption was created.
The recent holding of Vihlidal, disallowing application of the presump-
tion to defendants, yet preserving the right for plaintiffs, has acted
merely as an artificial barrier to the removal of this presumption and is
prolonging the life of a doctrine which has effectively been a dead letter
for many years. Moreover, in the interest of keeping the judicial process
83. Lear v. Shirk's Motor Express Corp., 397 Pa. 144, 149, 152 A.2d 883,
886 (1959). The Lear court stated:
This presumption of due care does not constitute proof that the
defendant was negligent. Neither does the mere happening of an acci-
dent prove negligence of either party. Evidence sufficient to warrant
recovery must describe, picture or visualize what actually happened suf-
ficiently to enable the fact-finding tribunal reasonably to conclude that
the defendant was guilty of negligence and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Mapp v. Wombecker, 421 Pa. 383, 385, 219 A.2d
681, 682 (1966) (mere happening of accident does not establish negligence by
either presumption or inference); Fegely, 417 Pa. at 449, 208 A.2d at 244 ("[I]t is
well established that the mere happening of an accident, even when a moving
vehicle strikes a pedestrian lying on the road, does not establish negligence by
either presumption or inference,").
84. One court stated that "[n]egligence . . . may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances attending an accident," such as the distance a car travels after a colli-
sion, since these types of circumstances are evidence of negligence and may bear
on matters such as the car's speed, as well as on the matter of control over the
vehicle. Scholl v. Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 217, 222-23, 51
A.2d 732, 735-36 (1947) (quoting Delmer v. Pittsburgh Rys., 348 Pa. 147, 149-
50, 34 A.2d 502, 504 (1943)). For a discussion of the weight to be given pre-
sumptions, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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free from confusion and clear from useless legal mechanisms, it is urged
that the holding of Vlihlidal be reexamined by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in light of the holdings in Rice, which were intended to revitalize
Pennsylvania's law in this area. Due care and man's natural instinct of
self-preservation need not be completely written out of Pennsylvania law
by this proposal. Instead, a suggested compromise may be found in
Rice, where the court urged that such considerations might be retained
as one factor for the jury's consideration in evaluating evidence of negli-
gence. 85 In any event the presumption of due care has long since out-
lived its usefulness. Because Vihlidal erroneously retains the
presumption of due care, practitioners should be wary of relying on the
case's impact until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is afforded an op-
portunity to re-evaluate the breadth of its holding in Rice.
Michael A. Pellini
85. Rice, 513 Pa. at 213,519 A.2d at 396; see also Waddle, 511 Pa. at 651,515
A.2d at 914 (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (treat presumption of due care merely as fac-
tor for consideration by jury evaluating negligence).
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